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Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.-A New Product
In the Area of Products Liability

A widow brought a strict products liability action in federal district
court in Louisiana for the wrongful death of her husband, who contracted cancer after being exposed to asbestos manufactured by the
defendant, Johns-Manville. After a trial on the merits, the jury rendered
a verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the asbestos was an unreasonably
dangerous product, exposure to which was the proximate cause of the
decedent's death.1
On appeal to the fifth circuit, Johns-Manville contended that it
could not be held strictly liable for dangers which were unforeseeable
at the time it manufactured the asbestos insulation products. The fifth
circuit certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the question raised by
the defendant's contention-i.e., whether a manufacturer in a strict
products liability case could be held liable for injuries caused by an
unreasonably dangerous product, which it manufactured, even though
it could not have foreseen the dangers posed by the product at the time
the product was designed and manufactured. 2 The Louisiana Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Dennis, held that a manufacturer
could be liable under those circumstances. In so holding, the court
created a new category of dangerous products-those which are "unreasonably dangers per se." Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484
So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986).

This note will examine the Louisiana Supreme Court's answer to
the fifth circuit's question in light of prior Louisiana strict products
liability decisions, identify the impact of Haiphen on the relevance of
the manufacturer's knowledge of the dangers created by its product and

Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REvvEw.
1. Mr. Halphen died from malignant mesothelioma, a rare form of cancer commonly
caused by exposure to asbestos. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 737 F.2d 462,
464 (5th Cir. 1984) (the first opinion which the fifth circuit rendered in this matter,
affirming the trial court's unreported judgment in favor of the plaintiff).
2. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 755 F.2d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1985). The
court of appeals had originally affirmed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff. 737
F.2d 462. However, the court subsequently recalled its affirmation in Halphen v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 752 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1985), and then posed its certified question
for the Louisiana Supreme Court in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 755 F.2d
393 (5th Cir. 1985). The subject of this casenote is the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion
responding to the certified question. It is this opinion that is referred to in the notes and
text when the case name Halphen is cited.
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on the status of the "state of the art" defense, discuss the practical
ramifications of Halphen on fact pleading and jury instructions, and
attempt to define the scope of the "unreasonably dangerous per se"
category.

I.

BACKGROUND

OF LOUISIANA PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The legal principles regulating delicts and quasi-delicts in Louisiana
are compiled in articles 2315-2324 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Civil
Code article 2315 sets forth the basic principle of assigning liability
based on fault,3 while the remaining articles in the chapter of the Code
detail the liability of a person based on his legal relationship with the
thing or person causing damage. These articles provide a basis for the
courts in Louisiana to expound theories of recovery for persons damaged
through the fault of another; in fact, the redactors of the Civil Code
4
have left the task of defining fault to the judiciary.
Civil Code articles 2315-2324, in addition to providing a basis for
traditional causes of action, such as negligence, also provide the foundation for the application of strict liability in Louisiana. By using the
liberal term "fault," which includes more than negligence, the codal
scheme attaches liability when there is a legal relationship between the
defendant and the act, person, or object causing injury. Louisiana courts
have derived from this codal foundation the cause of action in strict
liability. The courts have stated that this type of liability is "strict" in
the sense that no proof of negligence is required.'
The first time the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a cause of
action in strict products liability based on article 2315 was in 1971, in
the prolific case of Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. 6 By
doing so, the court added a new dimension to the term "fault" found
in article 2315.
Weber involved an action against a manufacturer of cattle dip for
injuries to the plaintiff's sons and for the loss of seven of the plaintiff's
cattle, both of which allegedly resulted from the use of the defendant's
product. 7 The court found the manufacturer liable for a manufacturing
defect, although no specific negligence was proven:
A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury
to the user is liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a
third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury

3.
damage
4.
5.
v. Gulf
6.
7.

Article 2315 provides in part that "[e]very act whatever of man that causes
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." (emphasis added).
Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 168 (La. 1985).
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (1971); Kent
States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 496 (La. 1982).
Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
Id. at 602, 250 So. 2d at 755-56.
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caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture
of the article, if the injury might reasonably have been anticipated. However, the plaintiff claiming injury has the burden of
proving that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and that the plaintiff's injuries were caused
by reason of the defect.
If the product is proven defective by reason of its hazard to
normal use, the plaintiff need not prove any particular negligence
by the maker in its manufacture or processing; for the manufacturer is presumed to know of the vices in the things he
makes, whether or not he has actual knowledge of them. 8
In providing a base for the formation of strict products liability law in
Louisiana, Weber defined "fault" in terms of a defect in the product,
and reasoned that a product was defective if it was "unreasonably
dangerous to normal use." 9 The opinion also imputed knowledge of
any vices in a product to the manufacturer, thereby relieving the plaintiff
from having to prove negligence. 10
In the fifteen years after Weber was written, it was the basis for
all actions in strict products liability in Louisiana. Weber and its progeny"
allowed persons to recover without proof of negligence, but gave manufacturers an avenue for avoiding liability if the particular injury was
not foreseeable (i.e., could not be reasonably anticipated). 12 The supreme
court's opinion in Halphen, however, seems to narrow this avenue for
escaping liability in some instances, and thus could be used to broaden
the basis of recovery for persons injured by defective products."

II.
A.

THE

Halphen Opinion

The Classifications of Unreasonably Dangerous Products

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in answering the question posed by
the fifth circuit, detailed the elements required in a plaintiff's strict

8. Id. at 602-03, 250 So. 2d at 755-56 (citations omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 756.
11. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Bell, 462 So.
2d 166; Hebert v. Brazzel, 403 So. 2d 1242 (La. 1981); DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest
Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980);
Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
12. See, e.g., Weber, 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754; Welch, 481 F.2d 252; DeBattista,
403 So. 2d 26; Hebert, 403 So. 2d 1242. Cf. Chappuis, 358 So. 2d 926. Contra Kent v.
Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982), in which the court said: "Under
strict liability concepts, the mere fact of the owner's relationship with and responsibility
for the damage-causing thing gives rise to an absolute duty to discover the risks presented
by the thing in custody." (emphasis in original).
13. One commentator has stated that Halphen rewrites the law of strict products
liability in Louisiana. See Crawford, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Part I-Torts,
47 La. L. Rev. 485 (1986).
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products liability case. The court, following prior Louisiana jurisprudence, stated that a plaintiff in a strict products liability case had the
burden of proving that he was injured by the product's condition, that
the product left the manufacturer's control in this condition, and that
4
the product was unreasonably dangerous to normal use.'
The court then described four classifications of products which are
unreasonably dangerous to normal use. 5 These classifications include:
products which are "unreasonably dangerous per se"; products which
are unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition; products
which are unreasonably dangerous due to failure to warn; and products
which are unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect.' 6 The court
said that negligence is not an element in a case in which recovery is
sought under either the "unreasonably dangerous per se" or manufacturing defect theories, because the manufacturer could still be liable
even if it could prove that it had used reasonable care in manufacturing
7
the product.'
1. "Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se" Products
In addition to the traditional classes of unreasonably dangerous
products recognized in most states, the Halphen court created a new
class of products which it described as "unreasonably dangerous per
se." This classification represents the purest form of strict products
liability, because the product's condition, and not the manufacturer's
conduct, must be impugned for liability to arise.
The court said that "for products in this category liability may be
imposed solely on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the product
irrespective of the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or conduct."'" Prior
to Halphen, a manufacturer was able to defend some products liability
cases by proving that, under the technology existing at the time the
product was manufactured, it could not have known of the dangerous
propensities of the product. This "state of the art" defense was available
to the manufacturer despite his being held to the knowledge and skill
of an expert.'

9

Under Halphen, a determination that a product is unreasonably
dangerous per se is to be made after a balancing of the risks involved

14. 484 So. 2d at 113.
15. The phrases "defective products" and "unreasonably dangerous products" are
used interchangeably throughout this note. Also, "unreasonably dangerous to normal use"
and "unintended defect" are used interchangeably.
16. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 113.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally, Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 115; Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
557 F. Supp. 1317, 1318 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
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in the use of the product against the benefits of the product, regardless
of whether the dangers (risks) were foreseeable. The court called this
balancing test a risk-utility or danger-utility test. 20
In creating the category of products which are "unreasonably dangerous per se," the court envisioned products which are so inherently
unsafe that they should not have been sold under any conditions. Professor Keeton has recognized this "unreasonably dangerous per se"
category as creating another basis for an injured plaintiff to recover.
Keeton defined an "unreasonably dangerous per se" product as one
which was "defective and unreasonably dangerous ...

under any mar-

keting circumstances." ' 2' In defining this theory, Professor Keeton disregarded the manufacturer's conduct totally, focusing instead on the
dangerous propensities of the product itself. Therefore, under this theory,
as in the corresponding category identified by the court in Halphen, a
manufacturer could not escape liability by showing that he was not
negligent, and that he had used due care, or that he could- not have
known of the dangers posed by the product under existing technology.
The irrelevance of the manufacturer's knowledge removes any consideration of his conduct from a case brought under this classification.
Thus, the "unreasonably dangerous per se" classification may be ca22
tegorized as a pure strict liability theory.
Two noted commentators have contended that the state of the art
defense has no relevance in strict products liability cases. Professor
Keeton has stated that it is irrelevant that a manufacturer could not
discover a risk associated with his product; a manufacturer should not
23
escape liability because the danger-in-fact was scientifically unknowable.
He suggests that "if inability to discover a risk or hazard . . . were a

defense, then, as a substantive matter, negligence becomes the basis for
24
recovery," rather than strict liability.
Professor Wade reached the same conclusion as Professor Keeton,
although he advocates a different method to hold a defendant liable
regardless of his lack of knowledge. Under Professor Wade's approach,
the court should assume "that the defendant knew of the dangerous
condition of the product and ask whether he was then negligent in

20. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 114 n.2.
21. W. Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398,
407 (1970).
22. A "pure" strict liability theory is one where a manufacturer may be held liable
despite his having used reasonable care in manufacturing the product, i.e., the manufacturer's conduct is totally irrelevant to his liability. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 114.
23. W. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of
Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 579, 595 (1980).
24. W. Keeton, Torts, 35 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1981).
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putting it on the market." ' 25 Thus, "scienter is supplied as a matter of
'26
law, and there is no need for the plaintiff to prove its existence."
Although Wade used the term "negligence," he did not seem to do so
in the traditional sense, in that his focus was on the product aifd not
the manufacturer's conduct. Other states and several commentators have
also recognized that state of the art should not always be a viable
defense in strict products liability, as is shown by the citation of other
states' jurisprudence in the Halphen opinion. 7

25. J.Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
834-35 (1973).
26. Id. at 835.
27. In Texas, strict liability focuses on the condition of the product, not the conduct
of the manufacturer, and, thus, evidence of its knowledge is irrelevant. Texas products
liability law does not recognize an "unreasonably dangerous per se" category as Louisiana
now does. However, it does have an "unreasonably dangerous due to design defect"
theory which is similar to Louisiana's "per se" theory, in that the state of the art defense
is not allowed. In Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Tex.
1983), another asbestos products liability case, the court stated that "liability in a strict
liability case rests on whether a prudent manufacturer, if it were aware of the dangers
involved in using its products as those dangers are now known, from hindsight, would

have placed the products into the stream of commerce." Id. at 1319 (emphasis in original).
Therefore, the Carter court would impute knowledge to the manufacturer. The court
summarized the status of the state of the art defense in Texas products liability law by
stating that:
A strict liability case based on lack of adequate warning may be defended by
an assertion that the manufacturer, held to the knowledge and skill of an expert,
could not have reasonably foreseen the danger. In a strict liability case based
on defective design, however, such an assertion, called by state of the art or
by whatever name, is irrelevant and impermissibly prejudicial; to permit such
an assertion would encourage the jury's focus for liability to improperly stray
from the condition of the product to the conduct of the manufacturer.
Id. at 1321. The court was in effect saying that, if the manufacturer, at the time he had
manufactured the product, had the technological capabilities which are available to him
today, and with this knowledge would not have put the product on the market, then he
cannot escape liability under the design defect theory. This category seems to conform
to the "unreasonably dangerous due to design defect" theory of Halphen under the first
subcategory of that theory (where the risk outweighs the utility of the product). Also,
the Halphen opinion is in accord with Texas products liability law in regard to the
irrelevance of evidence of the manufacturer's knowledge and evidence of technological
capabilities.
California and Missouri courts have also adopted the rule that a manufacturer cannot
escape liability by showing that he could not have known of the dangerous propensities
of the product under certain theories, such as in design defect cases. See, e.g., Barker
v. Lull Eng. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. 1978); Elmore
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984). The justification for adherence to
this rule was "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers [and sellers] that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Elmore, 673 S.W.2d
at 438. Accord, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
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The plaintiff has an easier case under the "unreasonably dangerous
per se" theory because evidence of the manufacturer's conduct and
evidence of the state of the art at the time of design and manufacture
is irrelevant. However, the plaintiff is still required to prove that the
danger-in-fact of the product outweighs its benefits, under the risk-utility
test.28 A similar balancing test has been used to determine whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous in Louisiana products liability cases
prior to Halphen. In Hunt v. City Stores, Inc.,29 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held an escalator manufacturer liable because its product was
found to be unreasonably dangerous to normal use. The court imposed
liability after finding that, because the "likelihood and gravity of harm
outweigh[ed] the benefits and utility of the manufactured product, the
product

. .

.[was] unreasonably dangerous." 30 This test is different from

the one in Halphen because the Hunt test does not consider whether
liability would still be imposed if the risk was unforeseeable. In Hunt,
because the manufacturer knew of the risk of danger, the court did not
have to address the implications of the manufacturer's inability to foresee
the risk.3
In Entrevia v. Hood 2 and Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,3 the
Louisiana Supreme Court also applied a type of risk-utility test. In
Langlois, the court spoke of balancing societal rights and obligations
in addition to applying the risk-utility test.3 4 The Entrevia court also
spoke of social utility as well as the need to consider moral and economic
factors. Further, in Entrevia, the court found the risk-utility test in
strict liability to be similar to that used in negligence problems.3"
In Halphen, the court modified the risk-utility test as applied in
earlier cases, when it created the "unreasonably dangerous per se"
category, by imposing liability even if the risk of harm was unforeseeable
at the time that the product was manufactured. Therefore, under the
Halphen risk-utility test, the plaintiff must prove that the product's
condition created a risk of harm that outweighs the benefits which flow
from it, regardless of whether the danger was foreseeable. Consequently,

901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364
(Mo. 1969). Missouri has implied that state of the art evidence is irrelevant, as is the
manufacturer's standard of care, because the product is on trial, not the manufacturer's
conduct.
28. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 114.
29. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980).
30. Id. at 589.
31. Id.
32. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
33. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
34. Id.at 1075, 249 So. 2d at 140.
35. Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1149-50.
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the court has expanded the scope of recovery under Louisiana strict
products liability.
2.

Unreasonably Dangerous in Construction or Composition

In addition to creating the new category of products which are
"unreasonably dangerous per se," the court in Halphen retained categories of products which prior jurisprudence characterized as unreasonably dangerous to normal use. One such category involves products
which possess unintended defects or abnormalities which make them
"more dangerous than [they were] designed to be.''36 The court set forth
the elements of this category of strict products liability based on a
manufacturing defect 7 by reiterating the principles espoused in Weber
v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co.3"
In this- category of unreasonably dangerous products, the product
left the manufacturer's control in an unintended condition that made
it more dangerous than it was designed to be. For imposition of liability
under this category, the plaintiff is not required to prove specific negligence on the part of the manufacturer. All that the plaintiff is required
to show is that the product was defective, and that he was injured by
using it. Therefore, the manufacturer cannot escape liability by showing
that he used reasonable care in manufacturing the product.3 9
Because no showing of negligence is required, the manufacturer
cannot introduce evidence of his knowledge (or lack thereof) of the risks
created by the defective construction. Furthermore, evidence of the state
of the art existing at the time the product was manufactured is irrelevant
"because the product, by definition, failed to conform to the manufacturer's own standards."' 4
3.

Unreasonably Dangerous Due to Failure to Warn

If a product is not "unreasonably dangerous per se" or unreasonably
dangerous due to a defect in construction or composition, a manufacturer
could still be held liable if he failed to adequately warn about a danger
created by a product. The product would be unreasonably dangerous41
because it lacks a warning about the dangers inherent in its design.
However, the manufacturer is required to warn only about dangers that
are not within the knowledge of the consumer. Likewise, the manufacturer is not required to warn about open or obvious dangers, of which

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Halphen, 484 So.
This defect is also
259 La. 599, 250
Halphen, 484 So.
Halphen, 484 So.
Id. at 114-15.

2d at 114.
commonly referred to as a construction or composition defect.
So. 2d 754; see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
2d at 114; Weber, 259 La. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 755-58.
2d at 114.
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the consumer should have knowledge. 42 With respect to these elements
of this category of products liability
law, the Halphen court followed
43
prior Louisiana jurisprudence.
The Halphen court went on, however, to require that a manufacturer
be held in its duty to warn to the knowledge and skill of an expert.
In this regard, the manufacturer is required to test its product as well
as to stay informed of scientific developments regarding its product."
This additional requirement was not explicitly imposed by prior Louisiana
a
jurisprudence, although other jurisdictions have included it.
Under this theory of recovery, the manufacturer, while being held
to the knowledge of an expert, can take advantage of the state of the
art defense, and can escape liability by showing that under the technology
existing at the time the product was manufactured, it could not have
known of the dangers involved in the design of the product, and therefore
it could not have warned about those dangers. In short, the manufacturer, despite having the knowledge of an expert, can escape liability
for failure to warn, if he is found not to have breached the duty because
the danger could not have been scientifically discerned."
4.

Unreasonably Dangerous Due to Design Defect

The fourth category of products cited in Haiphen as unreasonably
dangerous to normal use are those containing a design defect. The court
identified three grounds for finding that a product was designed in such
a way as to make it unreasonably dangerous. Each of these three
subcategories have different criteria which can be used in proving a
design defect. In two of them, the knowledge of the manufacturer and
47
the state of the art defense are relevant.
The first subcategory that the court -described overlaps with the
"unreasonably dangerous per se" category. The court used the dangerutility test explained in the "per se" category, and stated that evidence
regarding the state of the art defense was not admissible under this
subcategory of defectively designed unreasonably dangerous products.4
In the second subcategory, the court said that, although the danger
does not outweigh the utility of a product under the danger-utility test,
a product could still be defective as designed, if there were alternative

42. Id. at 115.
43. See Winterrowd v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 462 So. 2d 639 (La. 1985); Hebert,
403 So. 2d 1242; Chappuis, 358 So. 2d 926.
44. W. Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19
Sw. L.J. 26, 30-33 (1965).
45. Id.
46. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 115, 119.

47.
48.

Id. at 115.
Id.
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products available to serve the same needs with less risk of harm. 49
Under this subcategory, the manufacturer can raise the state of the art
defense, i.e., that under the technology existing when the product was
manufactured there was no alternative product available. Under the
alternative product subcategory, the defendant manufacturer is held to
the skill of an expert.50
The final subcategory under the design defect theory relates to
feasibility of alternative designs. Under this method of proving a design
defect, the plaintiff must show that, even though the utility of the
product is not outweighed by the harm, there was a feasible safer way
to design the product. However, the court said that a manufacturer,
while still held to the knowledge of an expert, could introduce evidence
of his lack of knowledge of feasible alternative designs."
B.

Possible Procedural Problems Created by Halphen

The court in Halphen said that a plaintiff could bring a products
liability suit against a manufacturer under any or all of the theories
which it set forth, and would be entitled to a jury instruction that
evidence under one theory is admissible only under that theory.52 Therefore, if a plaintiff elected to try his case under both the "unreasonably
dangerous per se" and failure to warn theories, the manufacturer would
be able to introduce evidence that under the technology existing at the
time that the product was manufactured, he had no way of knowing
that the product would cause harm, and thus he did not know that he
needed to warn about its (unknown) dangers. This state of the art
evidence would not be admissible under the "unreasonably dangerous
per se" theory, and the plaintiff could have the jury instructed to
disregard the evidence under this theory but to consider it under the
failure to warn theory. This would probably be confusing to the jury,
and at the very least, it seems unrealistic to think that the jury would
ignore this state of the art evidence under one theory and consider it
under the other. This type of instruction would likely result in the jury
either considering the evidence in determining liability under both theories, or disregarding the evidence altogether.
C. Answer to the Certified Question
After stating the elements of a strict products liability case, analyzing
the categories of unreasonably dangerous products, and laying out the

49. Id.
50. Id. See also W. Keeton, supra note 24, at 8-10; W. Keeton, Products LiabilityDesign Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cum. L. Rev. 293, 297-99 (1979); Brady
v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
51. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 115.
52. Id.
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procedural aspects of pleading and jury instructions, the court in Halphen
answered the certified question as to whether evidence of a manufacturer's knowledge is relevant in a strict products liability case. The court
basically stated that it depends upon what theory the plaintiff relies. In
a case brought under the "unreasonably dangerous per se" theory, or
a case under the construction or composition defect theory, the court
stated that evidence of the manufacturer's knowledge is not admissible
to support the state of the art defense. However, under the remaining
theories, evidence of the manufacturer's knowledge is admissible. Therefore, depending on which theories the plaintiff uses in developing his
case, the manufacturer may or may not be able to take advantage of
the state of the art defense.53
After answering the certified question, the court gave policy reasons
for its conclusions. The court first compared strict products liability to
codal strict liability and concluded that it would be unjust to hold an
owner of a harm-causing thing liable while releasing a manufacturer
who would be better able to bear the cost. In other words, since a
guardian of a thing in his control cannot escape liability by showing
that he could not have known of the dangerous propensities of the
thing,5 4 neither should a manufacturer be able to escape liability. The
court seemed to consider it especially important that the manufacturer
could spread the cost of defective products to the public.55
The court also seemed to think that holding a manufacturer liable
under theories which barred the presentation of evidence as to the
inability to discern scientifically the dangers of the product would "provide an effective incentive to eliminate all possible dangers before putting
the product on the market."' ' Nevertheless, this reasoning seems to mask
what is in this author's view the court's true objective of holding liable
the one with the deepest pocket. Saying that manufacturers will be more
careful if they know they will be liable should their products cause harm
may be true. But how can a manufacturer guard against harms created
by its products which it cannot possibly foresee? Also, if a potential
harm cannot scientifically be discovered, how can companies budget and
plan for potential losses? Perhaps the economics of holding manufacturers liable without any defense for lack of knowledge should not be
a concern of the court. At any rate, it is evident that the court feels
that it is equitable to hold a manufacturer liable for harm caused by
its inherently dangerous product which should never have been placed
on the market, regardless of whether the manufacturer could have discovered the potential harm.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 115-16.
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
See Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 116-19.
Id.at 118.
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D. Justice Watson's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Watson appeared to agree with the majority opinion's answer to the question presented in Halphen, he was unsatisfied
with the court's creation of the "unreasonably dangerous per se" category. He felt that this new category "shifts the focus of inquiry from
the true purpose of the balancing test which is to determine whether
'57
the danger presented by a product is reasonable or unreasonable.
Justice Watson implied that it was unnecessary for the court to
create the various classifications of unreasonably dangerous products,
because there was no need for differing degrees of unreasonably dangerous products. He also stated that lack of knowledge of the risk on
the part of the manufacturer had never been identified as a defense
asserted in a reported strict products liability case in Louisiana.5"
E. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marcus
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marcus stated that there is a
"presumption that the manufacturer knew or should have known of
the defects in its product," and that this is what "distinguishes all strict
products liability cases ...

from negligence cases.''

59

He continued by

observing that this presumption operates to ease the burden of proof
of the plaintiff, but not to make the manufacturer an insurer.6 Furthermore, he asserted, the Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that the
presumption of the manufacturer's knowledge exists only with regard
to what the scientific techniques could have discovered at the time of
manufacturing the product. However, in support of this conclusion,
Justice Marcus cited two failure to warn cases, and one case which is
now moot, 61 where there seemed to be no question that the manufacturer
62
knew of the potential dangers involved in the use of the product.
Consequently, the state of the art defense was not even used in these
cases.
In its conclusion, the dissent argued that it would be unfair and
unduly harsh to impose liability on a manufacturer who could not have
known of the danger and consequently could not have prevented the
harm.

63

57.

Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 119-20 (Watson, J., concurring).

58.

Id.

59. Id. at 121 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. The DeBattista opinion is moot because it is now prohibited by statute for a
claimant to sue a blood bank for defective blood. See La. Civ. Code art. 2322.1.
62.

Winterrowd, 462 So. 2d 639; Chappuis, 358 So. 2d 926; DeBattista, 403 So. 2d

63.

Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 121 (Marcus, J., dissenting).

26.

1987]
III.

NOTES
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE TO THE LOUISIANA
COURT'S ANSWER IN

SUPREME

Halphen

The fifth circuit, upon receiving the Louisiana Supreme Court's
answer to the certified question, affirmed the trial court's verdict finding
Johns-Manville liable. The court held that under Louisiana law, asbestos
was an "unreasonably dangerous per se" product, and that therefore
4
the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger was irrelevant as a defense.6
In so holding, the court stated that, while they "claim no prescience
as to the universe of products which ultimately will be given the cognomen unreasonably dangerous per se, . . . [they] find it apparent from
the citations and discussion in the certification response that the Supreme
Court of Louisiana places asbestos in that category." ' 65 This seems to
imply that, as a matter of law, asbestos is unreasonably dangerous per
se in Louisiana. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court nowhere
spoke of asbestos in its opinion, and although some of the citations
were to asbestos cases from other states, these cases were largely failure
to warn cases. Therefore, it seems that the federal court drew conclusions
beyond the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion, because it appears that
the Louisiana Supreme Court intentionally declined to determine what
products would fall into each of the classifications it created.
In the author's opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court intentionally
left open what products could be classified in each category because
the court realized that such a determination would be different in each
case, due to the distinct facts under which each claim would arise. The
fifth circuit should have used the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion
to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the asbestos under the Halphen
fact situation fell within the "unreasonably dangerous per se" category.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Halphen is at least a
clarification of Louisiana strict products liability law. At most, this
opinion represents a departure from prior Louisiana law, which, if carried
to its fullest extent, could greatly increase a plaintiff's chance of recovery
against a manufacturer under a products liability claim in Louisiana.
The greatest uncertainty after Halphen appears to be which products
will fall into the "unreasonably dangerous per se" category. Will it be
limited to products such as asbestos which seem to be almost ultrahazardous,6 or could it apply to a normally useful product that is

64. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 788 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. Id.at 275.
66.

An ultra-hazardous product is a product which, even when manufactured with

the greatest of care and prudence, is likely to cause harm to persons who use the product.
See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971), which explains
the liability associated with ultra-hazardous activities.
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defective? For example, what about a rocking chair that is designed
such that if toes get under its base, they will be severed? Would this
rocking chair be unreasonably dangerous per se?
The vague standards which Halphen sets forth are likely to make
it difficult for the courts of Louisiana in applying its principles. Also,
as to the universe of products which fall within the various categories
laid out in the opinion, the citations of authority offered by the court
furnish little guidance in this area.
Aside from the textbook-like theories advanced by Halphen, it seems
that Louisiana courts will have other problems in applying its principles.
This would seem to be especially true of the issues raised by the court's
apparent grant of authority to the pleading of more than one of the
theories of unreasonably dangerous products. The courts will have to
resolve the practical problems with the jury considering the manufacturer's knowledge under one theory and ignoring it under others, in
addition to resolving the problems inherent in pleading any theory at
all with Louisiana's system of fact pleading.
Only time will tell how Halphen will change Louisiana strict products
liability law. However, it seems that the courts may be reluctant to use
the new category of "unreasonably dangerous per se," as no Louisiana
court has addressed it since the opinion was released in March of 1986.
Michelle M. Hoss

